Planting Liberally

Tonight I attended one of the "house parties for change" organized by the Obama campaign. The house parties are meant to contribute to an ongoing conversation about what to do with the energy and structure that was the Obama volunteer organization.

If you think you've heard this song before, you're probably right - this was the question faced by Dean volunteers in the aftermath of his 2004 defeat, and there are similar, smaller-scale challenges faced by other candidates at the local level all the time. Dean's campaign operation ultimately became Democracy for America (DFA), and it and its far-flung network of chapters are still kicking. Given the founding conviction s of DFA - that progressives need to show up everywhere, and that voting is just the beginning of civic involvement - it wouldn't be too unreasonable to say that DFA was a prototype for the DNC's 50 State Strategy in spirit, although the mechanics of DFA and the 50 State Strategy are very different.

The problem of what to do with Obama's campaign structure is very different, for a number of reasons. One, Obama's campaign was much, much larger than Dean's. Two, in early 2004 there was a huge overlap between the netroots progressive movement and the Dean campaign, whereas the Obama campaign of necessity includes plenty of moderate and establishment Democrats, and no small number of Obama volunteers were Republicans. Three, and perhaps most importantly, Obama was in fact successful, he now has to govern, and his supporters have reason to expect that their priorities will be represented in the White House.

There are a few basic ideas running around for what to do with the Obama campaign, and they seem to include the following basic options:

• Supporting Obama. The Obama volunteers will become a support network for Obama's legislative priorities in Congress, and will presumably become a group dedicated to pressuring Congress and the media.
• Being active and possibly critical. The Obama volunteers will be called upon to stay active in, and to continue to sound off on, national politics. That could include commentary on change.gov or a successor website, conference calls with a randomly selected subset of Obama volunteers, MoveOn-style house parties, and other activities.
• Becoming active in local politics. Essentially following the DFA model, Obama volunteers will be encouraged to support other politicians in Obama's mold at the local level, thereby keeping the campaign going and turning volunteers attention towards a more local level.
• Service projects. Somewhat like the early version of the Edwards campaign (OneCorps), volunteers will be asked to take on local, mostly apolitical service projects - helping out in food pantries, conservation projects, etc.

There are strengths and weaknesses for each of these options, but I think the main complication is the fact that Obama will soon be president, and there is a limit to the amount of political campaigning he can do. At the same time, the email list is intensely Obama-focused; if it were to grow into an organization that became a hotbed of criticism of the administration, Obama could simply shut down the email list. Contra-wise, Obama can't just hand off the email list to a third party; or rather, he could, but a lot of list subscribers would unsubscribe, or stop paying attention.

This is a serious conundrum, but I think one idea which emerged from our house party tonight was quite interesting, and that was to use the house parties simply as a springboard for further policy-oriented conversations - or salons, if you like.

Here's one way this might play out. Every month, the members of the Obama email list are charged with holding house party conversations about some broad topic. Hosts could receive some basic informational materials about the issue, but attendees would be free to discuss other sources of ideas on the topic as well - articles, movies, books, whatever. Each house party could be charged with answering a set of questions, and the administration could commit to taking that aggregate response into account when crafting and directing policy. What's more, the topics could go on a six-month rotation cycle so that if an issue was discussed in February, it would come up again in August, and house party attendees would have a chance to give feedback on the government's performance on that issue. There could even be a chance for issue task forces to develop, in order to give more focused and frequent feedback on an issue in between the "spotlight" months.

This approach would, I think, neatly sidestep many of the thornier issues involved in keeping the Obama organization alive. It is political without being essentially campaign-oriented. It allows Obama to gather support and feedback, but it is appropriately open to everyone. Most importantly, it gives the Obama volunteer network something to do, and an ongoing set of opportunities for involvement and action.

There is still the not-insignificant problem of how this operation would be managed. Would it be run from within the government, as an essentially non-campaign operation with the White House's official support - and would that mean that emails gathered through the operation could not be used for campaign purposes? Or would it be essentially a shell for the 2012 campaign, and therefore a non-governmental entity which requires its own fundraising arm? This question is a bit thorny, but I actually think either answer would work out fine in practice.

I'm curious to see what becomes of these house parties, although I'm a bit dismayed that the campaign's progress on this question has been so slow, and that the communication about this problem appears to be very top-down. Unfortunately, I've also heard this song before in Massachusetts, when Deval Patrick promised to keep his campaign organization involved in governing post-election. Although there was a lot of hay made about the idea early on, and a few citizen task forces convened, the effort eventually fizzled. Here's hoping that Obama is more successful in this part of the transition.

In case you missed it, there was a full-on blogswarm this week, centering around the growing rift between the Religious Left and the Religious Industrial Complex. The blogswarm was touched off by Sarah Posner's article in Religion Dispatches, itself a response to Dispatches from the Religious Left. PastorDan has a good, linky reflection on the blogswarm at Street Prophets; check it out if you want the gory details.

The main line of argument, which we've seen before, is something like this: Religious Left-ists argue that reproductive choice and gay rights are not compromise-able issues, they are fundamentally matters of conscience. Democrats should not seek to "split the difference" with moderate religious voters over these issues, because people's fundamental rights are not something we should haggle over. The Religious Industrial Complex, represented this week by Faith in Public Life, counsels Democrats to do exactly that, pleading that it is possible to win elections by cajoling swing voters on these sorts of issues.

The Religious-Industrial Complex (Digby's term, but popularized and used frequently by PastorDan) has been making these sorts of arguments for a long time, and I think they are largely dubious. For one thing, I'm not convinced that religious moderates can be convinced by hair-splitting on abortion and gay rights; any kind of faith-based voting in this year's election was clearly overwhelmed by economic-meltdown-based voting, and there were other issues confounding the 2006 election results, too. For another thing, I'm not sure we would want to do that even if we could. Atheists and non-Christians, two groups that are significantly more progressive than religious moderates, are also growing quickly in size. Because of that, appealing too heavily to religious moderates by giving up core convictions on reproductive choice and gay rights could be a double-whammy: not only would that roll back progress on important issues, it might be electorally disastrous.

But I will say this much about the Religious-Industrial Complex: it is well-organized and it does a good job of persuading politicians and framing issues. It is all well and good for the Religious Left to talk about prophetic vision and social justice - that is clearly important - but projecting power requires this sort of organization and persuasion.

That is a point made abundantly clear in Dispatches from the Religious Left, by Fred Clarkson, Marshall Ganz and others. But I think we have yet to really talk about what kind of organizing is necessary. Certainly, there is a need for more and better grassroots community organizing on localized but important issues - the kind of thing that the Industrial Areas Foundation does. Certainly, there is a need to engage and mobilize progressive religious folks. Progressive congregations are already involved in some of that work, althouth there is always room for improvement. But there is also a need to aggregate and consolidate religious power on a larger scale, and that is where progressive voices are largely silent.

While this sounds like a grand task, I actually think it is a bit simpler than that. Consider what the Religious-Industrial Complex has accomplished, with really a very small number of practitioners: a handful of charismatic and popular religious leaders, speakers and authors (Jim Wallis, Rick Warren, Joel Hunter); a snappy political action committee (the Matthew 25 Network); an inside-the-Beltway think tank (FiPL) and a well-placed political consultant (Mara Vanderslice of Common Good Strategies). I don't even think these folks are really all that tightly integrated, in the sense that, as far as I know, they don't coordinate in closed-door strategy sessions on how best to promote, as Jim Wallis calls it, the "radical center". There is, to be sure, a common vocabulary within the Religious Industrial Complex, and it doesn't hurt to have that vocabulary parroted in media, and to have that vocabulary commonly (if incorrectly) assumed to speak for a large bloc of voters.

It would be tempting to look at this constellation of assets and think, "gee, we could build one of those for ourselves" - and no doubt the Religious Left could. But rather than mimicking the Religious Industrial Complex, I think the Religious Left needs to come up with its own structures for making the basic point that that there is a large and growing bloc of voters sympathetic to the beliefs and values of religious progressives, and that it is possible to win elections, and to govern, with the support of that bloc.

My instinct tells me that the Religious Left will come to power through quite a different path than the Religious Industrial Complex. In particular, the progress on marriage equality in the next couple of years is going to be a proving ground. Already, the Religious Left has been out front and very active on this issue. But with the new Democratic trifecta in New York, we have the potential to make a large, pro-active, legislatively-won gain on this issue, in a huge and important state. The shape of religious lobbying in that battle will be quite different than the defensive posture taken in the battle to resist Goodridge overrides in Massachusetts, and I think (or hope, in any case) that it will help create a new class of political operators, capable of gathering and wielding progressive religious support.

There are other opportunities, too. With Democrats in power until at least 2012, we will see the emergence of a new green energy industry, a fight for universal health care coverage, and new opportunities (and urgent need for) more union organizing. Each of these issues offers a different set of opportunities for the Religious Left to work with a new set of allies, and to set the stage for the emergence of a more progressive Democratic party.

Although there's been a lot of talk about Obama's picks for Secretary of State, Attorney General, and Secretary of Treasury, we've heard comparatively little about Obama's nominee for Secretary of Labor; the post remains unfilled.  Although it's a low-profile post compared to some of the other Cabinet picks, the Secretary of Labor is of paramount importance to workers and unions.  A sympathetic Secretary can improve working conditions for millions or, as we saw under Elaine Chao, Bush's Labor secretary, can make life very difficult.

On Facebook this week, Mariya Strauss jump-started the dormant conversation on the Secretary of Labor with a campaign to nominate Mary Beth Maxwell for Secretary of Labor.  Maxwell is Executive Director of American Rights at Work, a research and advocacy group which keeps an eye on union-busting, hostile labor decisions, and other threats to workplace democracy.   In recent years, ARAW has produced hard-hitting reports exposing the union-busting industry, criticizing the Labor Department and NLRB for anti-worker decisions, and lauding employers for good employment practices.

Maxwell is not the only name being floated for Secretary of Labor.  Others include David Bonior, Linda Chavez-Thompson, Dick Gephardt, and Andy Stern.  David Macaray analyzed the labor position thoroughly shortly after the election, concluding that we need a true advocate for labor, not just a careerist or generically capable administrator. Macaray's choice for the position is Thomas Geoghegan, a Chicago labor lawyer and author of Whose Side are You On.

I don't have a real favorite in this contest, but I certainly agree with Macaray on the principle that the next Secretary of Labor should be someone who understands threat to workers deeply, is serious about enforcing and expanding labor protections, and is committed to the vision of a strong and vibrant labor movement.  Vigorous protection for labor unions is key to revitalization of our economy and of the progressive movement; it is another progressive positive feedback loop.   I'd be curious to hear whether other folks have any picks for the position, or whether there are any thoughts on other key labor appointments, like the NLRB.

The Progressive States Network's focus this week is on universal voter registration.  This is an idea whose time is long overdue.  The kind of attention and pitched battles we fight over voter registration is nothing short of ridiculous, if you stop to think about it.  Basically, the purpose of voter registration is to allow the state to build a database of eligible voters, and to locate those voters in cities and precincts.  This is fundamentally a technical challenge, and really, not a very difficult one.  The fact that voter registration is a difficult and mammoth task is, in the age of sophisticated data matching algorithms and large scale database systems, a national embarrassment.

PSN, whose focus is on state policy reforms, rightly suggests a number of incremental steps towards making voter registration easier and more widespread.  These steps include aggressively mining databases to track citizens as they move about the state, making voter registration available at more places besides the DMV, etc.

That is a good start, but it seems to me that Congress could one-up the states, without too much effort.  Simply by matching records from the social security database with the list of tax returns each election year, the federal government could produce a "pretty good" list of all 18-year-old citizens, and the addresses for each of those people.  There would be some rate of error - as in the case of young adults who live in one place when they file their taxes in April, and have moved by the time elections come around in November - but I think it would be a reasonably good approximation.  Why not make that list the default voter roll, and then allow citizens who moved, or who didn't file taxes for some reason, to add themselves to the rolls after the fact?  To make things a little smoother, citizens could be given a web-based and phone-based interface to the database, to allow them to check their own registration status, indicate an address change, or perhaps even to find their polling place or request an absentee ballot by mail.

Having worked on identifier matching algorithms in the past, I am reasonably certain that this is technically a fairly simple idea, and won't be a budget-buster.  In fact, to the degree that it allows states to slim down their voter registration infrastructure, it might even come out costing the combined federal and state budgets less than the current regime.  (A small cost would be added to the US budget, and many small-ish costs subtracted from state budgets.)

The problem, as I understand it, is one of jurisdiction: voter eligibility has always been a state concern, except where the US Constitution bars certain practices (poll taxes and sex discrimination, for example).  So while Congress can produce a first-guess voter list, it can't mandate that such a list become the default voter list for any state.  However, the simple creation of this database might be enough to get the ball rolling.  Giving states the chance to cut costs and simultaneously make voting easier for citizens could be a good enough incentive to sign on some early-adopter progressive states.  As the system gains popularity, it could eventually become the de facto standard, exerting pressure on more conservative states to follow suit.  Congress could, presumably, add more and more "carrots" to encourage states to adopt the first-guess voter list as their default.

This policy is simple, cheap, and low-profile enough that, I think, it could sail through Congress relatively easy.  It's the kind of "Government 2.0" reform which it seems will be all the rage in Obama's Washington.  And it could be a progressive positive feedback loop which would help make the country more progressive in the long run.

In full-blown panic about an almost certain loss at the polls, conservatives are now trying to win the post-election narrative - they're trying to claim that, despite the election results, the country is still conservative.  The new watchword for conservatives is "center-right nation" - as in Jon Meacham's absurd piece in Newsweek which claimed that despite what looks like a wholesale rejection of conservatism at the polls on Tuesday, "America remains a center-right nation".  David Sirota has been doing yoeman's work beating back this meme, dedicating his column to Obama's FDR-style mandate, and running a Center-Right Nation Watch at OpenLeft.

The narrative of this county as a center-right one, despite what the polls may say on Tuesday, appears to be an important one in the post-election narrative.  It will be bolstered by exit polls which show something like 28-33% of the electorate identifying as "conservative", and 17-22% of the electorate identifying as "liberal", with the rest of the electorate identifying as "moderate".  According to the Roper archive of exit polls, ideological self-identification numbers have been hovering in that range since 1976, so if the numbers are substantially different than that on Tuesday, then we know that there's been genuine ideological movement.  Even what looks like a near-loss to conservatives - say, a 26-24% conservative-to-liberal self-identification gap - would actually be a huge victory for progressives.  Failing that kind of self-identification parity, progressives usually argue that we are a nation of "operational progressives", never mind the labels we give ourselves.  That is, that on many issues - especially economic issues - polls show that most people support the progressives point of view.  Campaign for America's Future and Media Matters made this argument most recently with an exhaustive review of recent polling in June 2007.

From the point of view of Election Night and the week following it, though, I think it's better not to bicker and parse over in this way.  We are almost certain to lose that game, since the simple numbers (the ideological self-identification numbers) are least in our favor.  Instead, I think the best approach is to promote the Democratic base as the new center of politics.

The basic idea is to promote the Democratic base, its enthusiastic support for Obama, and its incredible electoral power.  Point to Obama's repeated record-smashing small-dollar fundraising numbers.  Point to the historic crowds Obama has drawn in swing states like Missouri and Colorado in the last couple of weeks.  Point to the untold numbers of zany pro-Obama videos flooding YouTube.  Point to the unprecedented Obama ground game, and the dramatic turnaround in early voting, which is emphatically pro-Democratic this year, as compared to an even split with Republicans in 2004.

I've actually chosen these nuggets of evidence fairly carefully, and the common themes among them are: 1) they've already been reported by traditional media in the recent past; and 2) the Obama campaign is, itself, quite likely to refer to some of these nuggets in its post-election messaging.  In other words, these are the nuggets that are most likely to allow us to "close the triangle" on the post-election narrative.  The point is that we should amplify these elements of pre-existing conventional wisdom.

While this isn't exactly a logical counterpoint to the notion that this is a center-right nation, the argument is powerful for its evokation of progressive imagery.  In some way or another, many voters have already seen the proof of the progressive base supporting Obama - the footage of large Obama crowds, the Obama Girl videos, the long lines of early voters, the thirty-minute ad made possible by millions of donors, and even the incessant door-knockers bearing literature.  In addition to being powerful imagery, and imagery capable of closing the triangle on the post-election narrative, a great deal of this imagery "feels" historic, in that it is nothing like what many people have seen before; it matches the theme of an historic election.  If that image of an exuberant, powerful, massive progressive base is indelibly linked to the election results, conservatives will have no chance with the "center-right nation" canard.

Last week I wrote that we should begin planning for the post-election season, and begin shaping and amplifying our preferred post-election narrative.  I wrote that the ideal post-election narrative would be that Obama won on the strength of a green-collar melting pot coalition, one which values diversity fundamentally, which is keenly worried about the state of the economy, and which supports Obama's economic program of a green-collar, universal health care economy.

The purpose of this narrative is two-fold: first, to cast the election as a mandate for a progressive economic agenda; and second, to shift the demographic center of political discourse away from white Christian men, and towards a more diverse cluster of demographic groups, including women, African Americans, Latinos, young people, non-Christians, and LGBT individuals.  This kind of shift would have a longer-term impact of reducing the subtler forms of racism, sexism, and religious bigotry which have insinuated themselves into electoral coverage.

Since last week, there have been a few important updates on this narrative.

First, the McCain campaign seems to have doubled-down on Joe the Plumber.  That move, combined with a McCain loss, is a big victory for the "melting pot coalition" narrative, as it supports the notion that campaigns which focus on white male heroes are bound to lose.  As the cherry on top, we'd like to see Obama losing among white men on Election Day while winning the election; that would underscore the notion that Democrats don't need white men to win elections.  It would also refute the idea that McCain lost because he ran a bad campaign (more on that in a bit), or that "Joe the Plumber" was an ineffective hero in capturing white male voters.  The Research 2000 internal numbers have moved a bit in the last week, but not much.  Obama is losing men overall by about 3-5%, and whites overall by about 15%; although we don't have good R2K numbers on white men specifically, it sees that he's losing this group pretty solidly, and I think that is a good thing from the point of view of narrative development.

Second, and related to the first point, Republicans are going all-in on ideological warfare.  David Sirota's been doing great work pointing out that this move plays right into our hands - if McCain represents conservatism, an Obama win is a progressive mandate.  My guess is that the all-in move is what has helped narrow McCain's gap somewhat, as some of his base is returning to the fold; note R2K's sharp uptick in McCain Republican support over the last week.

Third, Arizona now appears to be in play, and Ted Stevens was found guilty of lying on his financial disclosure forms.  However much these developments help ensure victory on Election Day, I'm not sure they really help our post-election narrative very much.  With Arizona, the danger is that Obama's victory will appear to be the result of a singularly awful campaign on McCain's part.  Similarly with Alaska, the danger is that a Begich victory, and, if it materializes, a 60-seat Democratic majority, will be the result of bad Republican Senate candidates, rather than a good Democratic message on the economy.

Fourth, the Obama campaign is taking a more progresive turn.  Mostly this turn is fairly quiet, and it's played out in Obama's media strategy.  He is aggressively pushing back against Fox News while providing interviews to progressive media like the Rachel Maddow show and the Daily Show.  Given that few people vote based on the internal mechanics of a candidate's media strategy, this move doesn't really support one election narrative or another.  On the other hand, it does suggest Obama has reason to believe that progressive media is increasingly important in modern politics, and conservative media less so.  Also, it's a signal for progressives that Obama is increasingly willing to play nice, and may be receptive to the idea of a progressive mandate.  In the week or so following Election Day, we should continue to push him to claim a mandate for progressive economic reform, and thereby to help close the triangle on this narrative.

Given all of these developments, I think the basic arc of the post-Election narrative is fairly clear:

1. Obama's victory was driven by a massive grassroots volunteer operation, which helped build a massive and very effective ground game. Obama says as much himself, and is visibly proud of his volunteers; he is likely to say something about that on Election Night and in the days following.  Sharing this talking points helps close the triangle, and suggests agreement between Obama and progressives on what comes next.
2. Obama's coalition is much more diverse than past winning coalitions; it's comprised of a lot of people who have very little in common with Joe the Plumber.  This basic fact has been true of Democratic coalitions for a long time, but there are a couple of factors which emphasize the point this year.  Most obviously, Obama himself is not white; he visibly represents the non-white-male coalition.  Also, the McCain campaign has been increasingly willing to race-bait in recent weeks, and Obama's supporters have rejected this sort of campaigning.  Finally, there are the simple demographic facts, which show Obama winning despite emphatic losses among white men.  Obama is unlikely to talk about any of this, so it will largely fall to progressives to amplify this point.
3. Obama's progressive economic program, contrasted with McCain's conservative program and combined with the economic crisis, propelled Obama to victory.  This is perhaps the most tricky piece of the narrative, but I think it's actually fairly intuitive.  There's no question that the sharpening economic crisis solidified Obama's lead; and it's also fairly clear that Obama has been talking about a green collar economy and universal health care for a long time, since before the crisis began.  At the same time, McCain's rhetoric has clearly favored a conservative economic program.  The contrast couldn't be more clear, and the fact that conservatism lost this round, big-time, is also obvious.

Earlier this week, Chris Bowers fired up the 2008 Use It or Lose It campaign.  For those who are new to the campaign, the idea is simple but powerful: get Democratic Representatives and Senators who are in non-competitive races to pay all of their dues (which can be quite substantial) to the DCCC and DSCC, respectively.  These kinds of transfers are a legal, quick way to raise a lot of cash for the committees, and thereby to make a lot of new races competitive.  Chris estimates that we can raise as much as $6.5 million this way, and the campaign was very effective in 2006.

I think this is a brilliant idea, but I'm intrigued by the crowdsourcing (that is, distributed data collection) angle.  Distilled to the basics, this is a fairly straightforward crowdsourcing campaign, a couple of times over: get a group of volunteers to collect data about which Democratic Congresspeople are safe this year and how much money they have; then get volunteers to call those Congresspeople and ask them to pay their dues.  The key to success of the campaign is putting together a database which volunteers can use collaboratively to post updates and track progress in a systematic way.  Chris is using Google Spreadsheets for this purpose; that's a great tool and it's a great way to get the job done in a pinch.

However, it occurs to me that this kind of crowdsourcing task will only become more important in the future, and I think there's a way to streamline these kinds of campaigns and to make them even more powerful and robust.  Below, I propose the creation of a general-purpose crowdsourcing platform which can be used to fire up a distributed progressive pressure campaign on a variety of public institutions - Congress, the media, state legislatures.  The platform would make the lives of crowdsourcing organizers a little easier; it would enable our crowdsourcing campaigns to be more broadly distributed; and it would enable those campaigns to carry second-order effects which could help the progressive movement accrue and organize power over the long run. 

There are a variety of campaigns where we could use improved crowdsourcing capabilities.  To begin with, there are cases where we want to whip a Congressional vote or subcommittee vote on a key bill, like FISA or the bankruptcy bill.  Along similar lines, there are cases where state-level blogs will want to whip their state legislature on a high-profile vote.  These will likely be the most common uses, but there will also be cases where we want to pressure media outlets to take some step - like pressuring Ron Fournier to recuse himself from stories about the 2008 campaign, asking newspapers to carry more progressive syndicated columnists, or asking TV stations not to air Republican propaganda.  There's also potential for other kinds of commercial campaigns, like asking pharmacy chains to require pharmacists to fill emergency contraception (or fighting the next War on Christmas, I guess).  I imagine unions might make good use of such a platform for nationwide organizing drives, as well.

A typical crowdsourcing campaign is fairly simple, if labor-intensive; it usually requires the following steps (more or less):

1. "Casing" a campaign, i.e. doing some high-level investigation to ensure that there is potential for massive distributed pressure to be successful
2. Gathering data about who to contact, what their contact information is, and what specific "asks" to make of them
3. Narrowing the list of all possible contacts into a universe of "probably-persuadable"s
4. Making contacts and collecting responses from public officials / media outlets
5. Reviewing data and checking the progress of the campaign

A crowdsourcing platform would allow progressive activists to fire up a crowdsourcing campaign, and would minimize the work necessary in each of these steps.  Here are a few of the features I think would be necessary:

• A ready-made database with contact information for all Congressional offices, state legislative offices, and media outlets in the country, searchable by zip code or by state;
• The ability to collect and append campaign-specific data to this database, and to narrow the list of officials or media outlets into to target a "persuadable" universe;
• A general-purpose form and phone-script creation tool, capable of creating a form similar to the one which Obama's Neighbor-to-Neighbor program displays to volunteer phonebankers
• An easy-to-use data input tool, whereby volunteers could easily find their public official or media outlet, get the script needed to make the call, and enter the results of that call
• Reporting features, capable of quickly creating lists of public officials/media outlets who have been persuaded or are persuadable, and a link to a contact form for that public official; these lists should be embeddable, so that blogs participating in the campaign can display campaign updates easily
• A blogging / anecdotal reporting feature, capable of capturing success stories and campaign updates; and similarly, a microblogging feature; the feeds from these blogs should be available for easy aggregation into existing blogs
• "Evangelizing" features, including widgets, buttons and social networking "sharing" tools which campaign evangelists can use to distribute the campaign on blogs, Facebook profiles, etc. 

The tools necessary to develop a crowdsourcing platform like this are not out of reach.  Using an extensible content management system like Drupal, it would be fairly easy to throw together a prototype within a week or two.  The database of contact information should be relatively easy to obtain, if a bit irritating to maintain.

Down the line, it's easy to imagine a system like this being used to build power for the progressive movement, beyond the first-order impacts of a succesful campaign.  For example, if the system tracked the number of volunteers recruited by each campaign evangelist, then individual activists and organizations could wield the system's tracking reports as proof of their influence, in order to create further pressure in the future.  Additionally, the crowdsourcing platform could be integrated with ActBlue, allowing campaign volunteers to "reward good behavior", and, in tiny steps, to build a campaign war chest for progressive incumbents in off-years.  This kind of war chest development could also help good progressives at the local level rise to state or federal level on the strength of their good behavior.

Eventually, I imagine that a crowdsourcing platform would be the logical counterpart to the online electoral machine that progressives have built over recent years.  If we are going to have online voter registration tools, phonebanking tools, and general-purpose political social networking tools, then we should follow up on our election-year campaign activism with off-year lobbying activism.

I'd like to hear what your thoughts or on such a platform - particularly from folks who have worked on crowdsourcing campaigns in the past, and have some perspective on the kinds of features which would be useful to have in a platform like this.  I'd also certainly love to hear from technologists interested in putting together some kind of pilot, as I think this project would be a fun task for a BarCamp or developer jam session.  Finally, what are your thoughts on the larger role of crowdsourcing, or other lobbying tools, in the ecosystem of progressive online tools?  What else could we use, and what more could we do to be more effective?  Fire away below!

Disclosure: My company worked on a small design project for Chris and OpenLeft last year.

With Election Day rapidly approaching, it looks increasingly certain that Barack Obama will win the Presidency on November 4; solid Democratic majorities in Congress are essentially guaranteed.  The problem is, what will the headlines be on November 5?

In 2006, a dramatic tidal wave swept Democrats into power in the House and Senate.  The post-election narrative, howerver, focused on the closely-divided chambers, and lionized Rep. Rahm Emmanuel for having coordinated the Democratic victory.  The narrative favored Blue Dog Democrats, and stole a good deal of thunder from the progressive Democratic base.  As a result of that narrative (and existing structural disadvantages), progressive reform was largely stymied, despite some victories in early 2007.  The post-2004 election narrative, with the reification of "values voters" and the false assumption that anti-marriage equality ballot initiatives had pushed Bush to victory, was even more disastrous.

To avoid a similar fate this time around, progressives should prepare to define the post-election narrative for 2008.  Now, I'm well aware of the danger here - there are still 11 days to go, anything could happen, and we shouldn't become complacent.  It is, of course, important to keep working, and we should not let up on that front.  But it's possible to walk and chew gum at the same time.

Of course, the other problem is that we don't know exactly what the results will be.  Obama could conceivably lose, or he could win a very narrow victory.  We could hit 60 seats in the Senate, or we could fall just short.  And so forth.  Still, I think it's reasonable to predict reasonably that Obama will probably win a solid victory if not an overwhelming one, and that the House and Senate will be considerably more Democratic next year.  Based on those assumptions, I want to suggest a few key themes that we should push to develop before and on Election Night, and to suggest a coherent progressive narrative for Nov. 5.

Some key themes, and the Election Night data which should support them, include:

• The economy reigns supreme.  It's hard to deny that this issue has won news cycle after news cycle for Democrats.  Democratic messaging on the economy has been superb, and McCain's hail Mary move only made things worse for the Republicans.  The Democrats have argued that Republicans are out-of-touch, uncaring, corrupt, and ideologically unable to manage a complex economy.  Republicans argued that ACORN is registering Mickey Mouse.  On top of the Democratic critique of Republican policies, there is a solid progressive proposal emerging to solve the problem, and it's easy to grasp: develop the green collar economy.  The mandate for economic reform is clear and overwhelming, and Obama has clearly been running on this idea.  Look at the issue priority questions in the exit polls to verify this theme, but expect the economy to rank as the #1 issue.
• The extraordinary motivation of the Democratic base, and the strength of Obama's ground game.  Nate Silver's On the Road series at 538 has established tons of anecodtal evidence of this massive differential in volunteer enthusiasm.  The partisan registration gap, showing Democrats with a 7-9% registration advantage depending on who's reporting, is further proof of this motivation; it is also a result of that motivation, as Democratic volunteers register more and more Democrats.
• Growth in the size and enthusiasm of the African American electorate.  The early voting numbers in some states already indicate this theme, but the most visible proof of it will be nail-biting numbers out of North Carolina and Georgia.  If these states go for Obama, or are too close to call going late into the evening, this theme should emerge as an important factor in Obama's victory.
• Growth in the Latino electorate, and a return to the Democratic Party.  The polls so far have supported this theme, but the most visible demonstration of it will be an Obama hat trick in Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada, or possibly a larger-than-expected early win in Florida.  The Florida scenario is a bit unlikely (and could be written off to a variety of other factors besides), and the Western scenario won't play out until late at night, possibly 11 pm EST or later.  So this theme is likely to receive a bit less attention.  That's a shame, as I was hoping to see the 2007 rallies vindicated and proven effective.
• Obama's strength among young voters.  Future Majority, I'm sure, will be all over this theme in many different angles.  But let me try to get the party started.  First, young voters have not been, historically, much more Democratic than the rest of the electorate.  They were about 9% more Democratic than the rest of the electorate in 80, 4% less Democratic in 84, 1% more Democratic in 88, 1% more Democratic in 92, 12% more Democratic in 96, no more Democratic in 2000, and 16% more Democratic in 2004.  (I'm looking at the numbers for 18-24 year olds, as compared to the entire electorate, at the Roper Center's archive.)  Kerry in 2004 was the Democrat best supported by 18-24 year olds, and Obama will likely win this age set by 20 points, and maybe more.  Second, combining this historical data with the fact that young voters voted 14% more Democratic than the nation as a whole in 2006 (and here I'm mixing and matching a bit, using the 18-29 numbers from the CNN archive), we have an interesting result: young voters will have voted Democratic in overwhelming numbers three elections in a row.  That makes this demographic a likely Democratic lock for a long time to come.  This is a huge and extremely diverse demographic, it's solidly Democratic, and it's not going anywhere anytime soon.  That spells long-term disaster for the Republicans.
• Obama's weakness with white males.  It remains to be seen whether this weakness will, in fact, pan out on Election Day - the way things are going, nearly any demographic scenario seems plausible.  But the recent Research 2000 numbers suggest Obama will basically split male voters with McCain, and lose white voters emphatically, by 10-13 points.  It seems reasonable to believe that Obama will win without much help from Joe the plumber.
• The death of the Bradley effect.  Related to the above, it will be interesting to see if Obama significantly underperforms the polls among white voters.  I am hoping to see the polls show Obama pull about as many white voters as were predicted by the polls, which would, hopefully, ring the death knell for the Bradley effect.  This canard has hampered the electoral prospects of far too many statewide African American candidates already.
• Continuing weakness with white Evangelicals.  Issues with a religious overtone have taken a backseat throughout this election cycle, but it's worth noting that the once-or-more-a-week white Evangelical crowd is still solidly in the Republican camp, and seem entirely unaffected by the economic news.  Street Prophets has more.
• New geographic firewall.  A win in Virginia, Ohio or Colorado should solidify the status of each of those states as a Democratic stronghold, having elected Democrats repeatedly in recent statewide elections, and now sealing the deal on a Democratic White House.  This firewall, if it holds, makes a Republican victory in 2012 nearly impossible.
• Un-real America responds.  An Obama victory in Virginia, paticularly one driven by strength in unexpected parts of the state, the defeat of Michelle Bachmann, and to some degree the defeat of Saxby Chambliss would support a theme of revenge for the tasteless un-American comments that have been a mainstay of Republican politics for so long.  Obama strength in suburban areas would also drive this theme.
• Individual symbolic victories.  Victories by progressive heroes like Darcy Burner and Al Franken, and the defeat of Prop. 8 in California, would demonstrate the strength of the progressive movement.  Defeat of Saxby Chambliss (see above) or Mitch McConnell would be particulalry crushing for Republicans.
• The union vote.  Over the past few months, union leaders have been expressing some fear that some of their white members would defect to McCain rather than voting for an African American president.  I've been skeptical of those fears for some time, especially given the prevalence of people of color and women in union membership rolls, and the extraordinary job unions have done in getting their members to the polls in recent years.  I imagine that the newfound prevalence of economic issues will help Obama capture as many union votes as Kerry did, if not more, but there's really not much polling on this issue.  Kerry's benchmark is 61% of the union household vote, which comprised 24% of the electorate.  In 2006, Democrats pulled 65% of the union household vote, which was 23% of the electorate.  It'll be interesting to see where the trendlines go.
• Up-ticket support vs. down-ticket support.  It will be interesting to see how Obama performs against other Democrats up and down the ticket.  Obama is likely to underperform two early-reporting Senate victories, the Shaheen race in NH and the Warner race in Virginia.  These might establish a theme that down-ticket Democrats are helping Obama, rather than the other way around.

There is a simple way to unite all of these themes under one narrative: progressive realignment.  As Paul Rosenberg has argued for a couple of years, and as John Judis and Ruy Teixeira predicted a long time ago, this election is about the victory of a powerful progressive coalition, which will provide the backbone for a strong Democratic majority.  The coalition is composed of people of color, young voters, women, religious minorities, LGBT individuals, and union households.  Whites, particularly white males and white evangelicals, play a remarkably small role.  What's more, the primary beneficiary of this coalition (Obama) is also a great representative of it.

With the election of the country's first African American president, this will be a historic moment.  Indeed, there is more than just history being made this year, but, perhaps, history being repeated.  Despite all the comparisons of this election to those of 1980, 1996, or just about any other in recent memory, perhaps the most fitting is that of 1932.  In that year, an economic disaster solidified a coalition of demographic groups who were capable of providing a long-term popular backbone for a massive new economic program and, eventually, a new world order.

There are reasons to view this election as a sign of even greater progressive strength than that of 1932.  FDR's political accomplishment was holding together a coalition of groups - including Southern whites and Northern racial and ethnic minorities - who actually did not have a lot in common, except for an economic crisis.  Obama's coalition has much more internal cohesion, and its foundational value is diversity - whether racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual.  Indeed, even the centerpiece of Obama's economic policy - the green collar economy and health care for everyone - is ultimately about diversifying our energy portfolio and our economic base.  Obama's central campaign themes are rooted in this foundational value: unity (because we are all different, but we still have to live together) and change (away from a government that excludes many demographic groups.)  The value of diversity, ironically, is a major point of unity for the Obama coalition, and it's hard to see that value becoming less important, even after the economic crisis is solved.  While there are certainly matters of contention betwen different elements of the base (like continuing tensions between some African American religious leaders and GLBT groups, or between unions and young professionals), as a whole I think the Obama coalition is considerably more internally cohesive than the FDR coalition was.

It's important that we center the discussion of this election around this coalition, and the strong mandate for diversity and economic change it represents.  This is going to be a bit difficult, since the coalition is by its nature not as easily typified as past coalitions, with their soccer moms and NASCAR dads.  Still, I think it would be fair to characterize this coalition as "the green-collar melting pot" coalition, or something similar.  Such a characterization would not only reify a major progressive goal (the establishment of a green-collar economy), it would also move the center of politics away from the white suburban voter, and would cast the election not as a victory for Obama, but as a victory for Obama's base.

This is a subtle distinction, but an important one: it's the difference between giving Obama a blank check, and laying the groundwork for a progressive critique of an Obama administration; it's the difference between allowing Blue Dogs to hold sway in Congress, and setting up progressive Democrats in Congress as the "loyal opposition" to Obama.  Moreover, this is a distinction which already has a basis in Obama's rhetoric.  Obama has, in Dean-like fashion, consistently held up for praise his own volunteer base, throughout his campaign.  Given the widespread view that Obama is a progressive, progressives might as well stand up and own the logical conclusion: that the progressive base, the "green collar melting pot" coalition, was the powerhouse behind this landslide.

Ideally, I'd love to see progressive pundits capable of making these points forcefully and analyzing the kind of data I referred to above on-the-fly on Election Night.  My "dream team" lineup of pundits would probably include Ruy Teixeira, Van Jones, Simon Rosenberg, Nate Silver, and David Sirota.  (Silver, I believe, will be hanging out with Dan Rather that night, so at least some of these pundits will be well-situated.)  There are probably many others I'm leaving out, and I'd certainly like to hear some suggestions in the comments.

On the whole, here's what I'm wondering: Are there any themes or important data points I'm leaving up in my list above?  Does this narrative make sense, or is it entirely off?  Besides pushing this narrative in the blogosphere and trying to encourage the major news networks to choose a progressive lineup of pundits, what can we do to establish and solidify this narrative?  I'd love to hear your thoughts in the comments. 

If you missed our book launch for Dispatches from the Religious Left earlier this week, you can check out many of the same speakers from the event discussing the Religious Left on GritTV:

Laura Flanders really pushes the panelists on the electoral might of the Religious Left. I think it's no secret that the Religious Left is no match, electorally, for the Religious Right. The panelists are all sort of grappling with this problem, and how to solve it, paper over it, or just accept it. The shadows of religious activism in the 60's weighs heavily over this discussion.

I'm of a few minds on this question. Is it right for churches, to sink their teeth in electoral politics? Maybe in some non-partisan ways. Is it right for non-church political action committees - a leftist version of the Christian Coalition, say - to form and begin organizing across election cycles, the way MoveOn and DFA do? I think that's considerably more acceptable, as long as those organizations follow all the appropriate tax laws.

I also think that we are focused a little too keenly on electoral politics. There are other ways to accrue organized power in the US, and some of these methods are much less legally tricky. One way is to grow aggressively, to accrue members who are more likely to vote progressive simply because they are a member of a progressive religious community. Another way is to define a progressive theology which differs with conservative theology, and to attach the conservative political worldview at its foundation.

A final, and perhaps most important, method is to "rehearse our idealist vision" in congregations, as Rev. Dr. Jacqui Lewis says in the GritTV video. That means that congregations become explicitly inclusive, multi-racial and multi-ethnic, and welcoming to LGBT individuals. It also means that they incubate and nurture community organizations and labor unions, and help marginalized people gain power. This kind of work not only makes the world a more just place; it also accrues power by creating lifelong progressives, people who are viscerally, and more or less permanently, connected to progressive values through real-life experience.

To be sure, some congregations are already doing some of this work. But are enough of them doing it? At the book launch, Rev. Lewis says that only 4% of Christian congregations in the country are explicitly multi-racial; there are certainly some progressive ones in the remaining 96%. I don't know what the numbers are on churches which are incubating labor unions and community organizing, but there is certainly more to do.

The book launch for Dispatches from the Religious Left is coming up on Tuesday, Oct. 14.  In anticipation of the event, I'm running a series this weekend on a few essays from the book.  Yesterday I wrote about PastorDan's essay on the role of the Religious Left (PastorDan responded here), as well as Rev. Debra Haffner and Timothy Palmer's essay on a theology of sexual justice.

The third part of the book is dedicated to "getting from here to there", and is a bit more nuts-and-bolts-oriented than the first two parts.  It includes the essay my wife and I wrote on new media, which focuses on helping religious organizations find their voice online.  However, since that material is probably pretty familiar to many blog readers, I'm instead going to focus on the contribution by Frederick Clarkson (who is also the editor of the book), titled "Three wheels that need not be reinvented".

Fred's main argument is that the Religious Left must get more involved in electoral politics.  By way of contrast he points to the Religious Right, which actively participates in party primaries, registers voters, and maintains high-quality voter lists that persist from one cycle to another.  All of these ingredients help the Right exert power far beyond its numbers, and Clarkson argues that the Left must respond in kind in order to realize its vision.  His chapter profiles three progressive political organizations in Massachusetts, and offers them as organizing models for Religious Leftists.

The first organization is Neighbor-to-Neighbor, a statewide organization whose goal is to register voters in low-income communities in order to boost turnout and elect progressive representative.  The organization has a "Working Families Agenda" which it uses to engage and register voters throughout the year.  At election time, these efforts are reinforced by personal contact.  In this way, Neighbor-to-Neighbor keeps its constituents engaged across election cycles, and is able to build a high-quality voter list which forms the basis for electoral efforts.

The second organization is Progressive Democrats of Massachusetts, an alliance of volunteer-run chapters throughout the state.   PDM was founded in the wake of Robert Reich's unsuccessful bid for governor in 2002.  Reich's run was a rallying point for progressives in a very un-progressive year, and in some ways helped pave the way for Deval Patrick's dramatic upset victory in 2006.  PDM's goal is to elect progressives in Democratic party primaries - which, in many areas in Massachusetts, is really where the election is held, since voters overwhelmingly back Democrats in the general election.

The third organization is MassVote, née BostonVote.  MassVote encourages non-profit social service agencies to register and mobilize their constituents, in order to build support for their programs within state government.  The organization has developed an innovative set of resources to conduct this kind of registration and mobilization at low cost, and within the rules for electioneering by non-profits.  This last point should be emphasized: the organization doesn't encourage its member agencies to engage in partisan activity; instead, agencies do non-partisan voter registration and education work.  That work brings more progressive voters to the polls, and elects progressive representatives; but that's incident to the target voter population, rather than the result of any particularly partisan activity.  (Disclosure: A few years ago MassVote was a prospective client for the company I worked for at the time.)

Clarkson wants the Religious Left to adopt some of these models and integrate it into its own work - while following IRS rules.  As MassVote clearly demonstrates, it is possible to create a progressive electorate without stepping outside the boundaries of 501(c)3 regulations, simply by targeting non-partisan voter registration, mobilization, and non-biased education efforts at progressive voter populations.

Fred's essay is a good starting point for prodding religious organizations to participate in electoral politics.  However, I think the Religious Left will need to build some infrastructure - both theoretical and organizational - in order to realize this vision.

For starters, we will need to create and promote what I call a "theology of participation" - an argument that democratic participation by our congregations is not just ok, but in fact necessary.  Many liberal congregations are already committed to social justice in a variety of ways, so I don't think this will be a particularly hard sell.  On the other hand, some liberal congregations are also instinctively allergic to politics in the pulpit, and congregants might become incensed at anything which appears to violate the spirit of separation of church and state separation.  Religious leaders who want to register and mobilize their congregations should be clear about a few key points: first, that democratic participation is a profound act of bearing witness to one's value system; second, that it is a way to support the church's social justice mission; and finally, that the congregation is not endorsing any party or candidate, and that it is up to individual congregants to decide which candidate or party will best support social justice.

On top of this theology of participation, congregations will need to layer a set of practices to encourge participation.  These practices begin with voter registration drives.  They also include basic education, especially for local elections.  Congregations should ensure that their members know when the election is as well as the meaning of various offices on the ballot is.  Finally, within certain boundaries, congregations can help their members learn about the candidates who are running for office.  This last step will require a great deal of delicacy, as it's entirely easy to cross the line from voter education to candidate endorsement - even without intention.  Some congregations may want to eschew this step entirely, or may want to simply encourage their members to obtain a copy of the ballot a week or two before the election and to educate themselves.  (Or to organize their own ballot parties.)

On top of this level of activity within congregations, the Religious Left should build organizations which can aggregate this activity and harvest the results across election cycles.  Congregation-organized voter registration drives should be harvested into long-lasting and well-maintained voter lists.  Those voters, in turn, should be engaged about important issues year-round, and should be targeted for mobilization at election time.  This kind of work is too far outside the mission of individual congregations.  And it is not particularly well-suited to single-issue groups like the Religious Coalition for Reproductive Choice.  So new, multi-issue issue groups will need to be built.

In some ways, this three-tiered approach to voter registration and mobilization - beginning with theological foundations, proceeding to routine practice, and culminating in aggregation and professional cross-cyclical efforts - is just the beginning.  As a movement with a broad commitment to social justice, the Religious Left can, and should, be heavily involved in building progressive power outside of the voting booth.  In particular, the Religious Left should incubate labor organizing and community organizing efforts; leaders should encourage their congregations to support these organizations in meetings and on picket lines, and should offer meeting space or other resources where necessary.  Not only are these efforts non-partisan, but they are profoundly faithful acts of social justice, which will have a strong foundation in the theological tradition of the vast majority of Religious Left congregations.  (Indeed, many liberal congregations are already doing this kind of work, and have been doing it for a long time, much to their credit.  I'm merely arguing for more of this kind of work, and for liberal congregations to be more pro-active in seeking out and supporting this kind of capcity-building social justice work, where it makes sense.)  In most cases, this kind of work will ultimately result in more power for the progressive movement, but that is just the natural result of empowering marginalized people, rather than an explicit act of partisanship.

Fred Clarkson has been arguing for a more electorally engaged Religious Left for a long time.  He's seen the Religious Right's efforts to build power in Republican Party committees and primaries in person.  The kind of voter registration and mobilization efforts he advocates for - and many others - are long overdue.